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Richard Bejtlich's blog on digital security, strategic thought, and military history.

Last Build Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 03:28:49 +0000


Importing Pcap into Security Onion

Mon, 26 Feb 2018 17:02:00 +0000

Within the last week, Doug Burks of Security Onion (SO) added a new script that revolutionizes the use case for his amazing open source network security monitoring platform.I have always used SO in a live production mode, meaning I deploy a SO sensor sniffing a live network interface. As the multitude of SO components observe network traffic, they generate, store, and display various forms of NSM data for use by analysts.The problem with this model is that it could not be used for processing stored network traffic. If one simply replayed the traffic from a .pcap file, the new traffic would be assigned contemporary timestamps by the various tools observing the traffic.While all of the NSM tools in SO have the independent capability to read stored .pcap files, there was no unified way to integrate their output into the SO platform.Therefore, for years, there has not been a way to import .pcap files into SO -- until last week!Here is how I tested the new so-import-pcap script. First, I made sure I was running Security Onion Elastic Stack Release Candidate 2 ( ISO) or later. Next I downloaded the script using wget from continued as follows:richard@so1:~$ sudo cp so-import-pcap /usr/sbin/richard@so1:~$ sudo chmod 755 /usr/sbin/so-import-pcapI tried running the script against two of the sample files packaged with SO, but ran into issues with both.richard@so1:~$ sudo so-import-pcap /opt/samples/10k.pcapso-import-pcapPlease wait while......creating temp pcap for processing.mergecap: Error reading /opt/samples/10k.pcap: The file appears to be damaged or corrupt(pcap: File has 263718464-byte packet, bigger than maximum of 262144)Error while merging!I checked the file with capinfos.richard@so1:~$ capinfos /opt/samples/10k.pcapcapinfos: An error occurred after reading 17046 packets from "/opt/samples/10k.pcap": The file appears to be damaged or corrupt.(pcap: File has 263718464-byte packet, bigger than maximum of 262144)Capinfos confirmed the problem. Let's try another!richard@so1:~$ sudo so-import-pcap /opt/samples/zeus-sample-1.pcapso-import-pcapPlease wait while......creating temp pcap for processing.mergecap: Error reading /opt/samples/zeus-sample-1.pcap: The file appears to be damaged or corrupt(pcap: File has 1984391168-byte packet, bigger than maximum of 262144)Error while merging!Another bad file. Trying a third!richard@so1:~$ sudo so-import-pcap /opt/samples/evidence03.pcapso-import-pcapPlease wait while......creating temp pcap for processing....setting sguild debug to 2 and restarting sguild....configuring syslog-ng to pick up sguild logs....disabling syslog output in barnyard....configuring logstash to parse sguild logs (this may take a few minutes, but should only need to be done once)...done....stopping curator....disabling curator....stopping ossec_agent....disabling ossec_agent....stopping Bro sniffing process....disabling Bro sniffing process....stopping IDS sniffing process....disabling IDS sniffing process....stopping netsniff-ng....disabling netsniff-ng....adjusting CapMe to allow pcaps up to 50 years old....analyzing traffic with Snort....analyzing traffic with Bro....writing /nsm/sensor_data/so1-eth1/dailylogs/2009-12-28/snort.log.1261958400Import complete!You can use this hyperlink to view data in the time range of your import:https://localhost/app/kibana#/dashboard/94b52620-342a-11e7-9d52-4f090484f59e?_g=(refreshInterval:(display:Off,pause:!f,value:0),time:(from:'2009-12-28T00:00:00.000Z',mode:absolute,to:'2009-12-29T00:00:00.000Z'))or you can manually set your Time Range to be:From: 2009-12-28    To: 2009-12-29Incidentally here is the capinfos output for this trace.richard@so1:~$ capinfos /opt/samples/evidence03.pcapFile name:           /opt/samples/evidence03.pcapFile type:           Wireshark/tcpdump/... - pcapFile encapsulation:  EthernetPacket size limit:   file hdr: 65535 bytesNumber of packets:[...]

Lies and More Lies

Mon, 22 Jan 2018 14:28:00 +0000

Following the release of the Spectre and Meltdown CPU attacks, the security community wondered if other researchers would find related speculative attack problems. When the following appeared, we were concerned:

"Skyfall and Solace

More vulnerabilities in modern computers.

Following the recent release of the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities, CVE-2017-5175, CVE-2017-5753 and CVE-2017-5754, there has been considerable speculation as to whether all the issues described can be fully mitigated. 

Skyfall and Solace are two speculative attacks based on the work highlighted by Meltdown and Spectre.

Full details are still under embargo and will be published soon when chip manufacturers and Operating System vendors have prepared patches.

Watch this space..."

It turns out this was a hoax. The latest version of the site says, in part:

"With little more than a couple of quickly registered domain names, thousands of people were hooked...


The idea here was to suggest a link to Intel's Skylake processor.


The idea here was to suggest a link to the Solaris operating system.

Copy the styling of the original Meltdown and Spectre sites and add a couple of favicons based loosely on the Intel and Solaris logos and I was nearly done.

The final step was to add on https, because if a site's got an SSL certificate it must be legitimate, and the bait was set."

The problem with this "explanation" is that it wasn't just a logo, domain name and SSL certificate. The "security professional" who created this site outright lied, as shown at the top of this post. Don't fall for his false narrative.

I'm not naming names or linking to the sites here, because the person responsible already thinks he's too clever.

Addressing Innumeracy in Reporting

Tue, 16 Jan 2018 17:27:00 +0000

Anyone involved in cybersecurity reporting needs a strong sense of numeracy, or mathematical literacy. I see two sorts of examples of innumeracy repeatedly in the media.The first involves the time value of money. Recently CNN claimed Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos was the "richest person in history" and Recode said Bezos was "now worth more than Bill Gates ever was." Thankfully both Richard Steinnon and Noah Kirsch recognized the foolishness of these reports, correctly noting that Bezos would only rank number 17 on a list where wealth was adjusted for inflation.This failure to recognize the time value of money is pervasive. Just today I heard the host of a podcast claim that the 1998 Jackie Chan movie Rush Hour was "the top grossing martial arts film of all time." According to Box Office Mojo, Rush Hour earned $244,386,864 worldwide. Adjusting for inflation, in 2017 dollars that's $367,509,865.67 -- impressive!For comparison, I researched the box office returns for Bruce Lee's Enter the Dragon. Box Office Mojo lacked data, but I found a 2017 article stating his 1973 movie earned "$25 million in the U.S. and $90 million worldwide, excluding Hong Kong." If I adjust the worldwide figure of $90 million for inflation, in 2017 dollars that's $496,864,864.86 -- making Enter the Dragon easily more successful than Rush Hour.If you're wondering about Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, that 2000 movie earned $213,525,736 worldwide. That movie earned less than Rush Hour, and arrived two years later, so it's not worth doing the inflation math.The take-away is that any time you are comparing dollars from different time periods, you must adjust for inflation to have your comparisons have any meaning whatsoever.Chart by @CanadianFlagsThe second sort of innumeracy I'd like to highlight today also involves money, but in a slightly different way. This involves changes in values over time.For example, a company may grow revenue from 2015 to 2016, with 2015 revenue being $100,000 and 2016 being $200,000. That's a 100% gain.If the company grows another $100,000 from 2016 to 2017, from $200,000 to $300,000, the growth rate has declined to 50%. To have maintained a 100% growth rate, the company needed to make $400,000 in 2016.That same $100,000 dollar increase isn't so great when compared to the new base value.We see the same dynamic at play when tracking the growth of individual stocks or market indices over time.CNN wrote a story about the 1,000 point rise in the Dow Jones Industrial Average over a period of 7 days, from 25,000 to 26,000. One person Tweeted the chart at the above right, asking "is that healthy?" My answer -- you need a proper chart!My second reaction was "that's a jump, but it's only (1-(25000/26000)) = 3.8%. Yes, 3.8% in 7 days is a lot, but that doesn't even rate in the top 20 one-day percentage gains or losses over the life of the index.If the DJIA gained 1,000 points in 7 days 5 years ago, when the market was at 13,649, a rise to 14,649 would be a 6.8% gain. 20 years ago the market was roughly 3,310, so a 1,000 point rise to 4,310 would be a massive 23.2% gain.A better way to depict the growth in the DJIA would be to use a logarithmic chart. The charts below show a linear version on the top and a logarithmic version below it.Using, I drew the last 30 years of the DJIA at the top using a linear Y axis, meaning there is equal distance between 2,000 and 4,000, 4,000 and 6,000, and so on. The blue line shows the slope of the growth.I then drew the same period using a logarithmic Y axis, meaning the percentage gains from one line to another are equal. For example, a 100% increase from 1,000 to 2,000 occupies the same distance as the 100% increase from 5,000 to 10,000. The green line shows the slope of the growth.I put the blue and green lines on both charts to permit comparison of the slopes. As you can see, the growth, when properly indicated using a log chart and the green line, is less than the exaggerations introduced by the linear chart blue line.Ther[...]

Remembering When APT Became Public

Sun, 14 Jan 2018 18:54:00 +0000

Last week I Tweeted the following on the 8th anniversary of Google's blog post about its compromise by Chinese threat actors:This intrusion made the term APT mainstream. I was the first to associate it with Aurora, in this post first APT post was a careful reference in 2007, when we all feared being accused of "leaking classified" re China: should have added the term "publicly" to my original Tweet. There were consultants with years of APT experience involved in the Google incident response, and they recognized the work of APT17 at that company and others. Those consultants honored their NDAs and have stayed quiet.I wrote my original Tweet as a reminder that "APT" was not a popular, recognized term until the Google announcement on 12 January 2010. In my Google v China blog post I wrote:Welcome to the party, Google. You can use the term "advanced persistent threat" (APT) if you want to give this adversary its proper name.I also Tweeted a similar statement on the same day:This is horrifying: Google admits intellectual property theft from China; it's called Advanced Persistent Threat, GOOGI made the explicit link of China and APT because no one had done that publicly.This slide from a 2011 briefing I did in Hawaii captures a few historical points:The Google incident was a watershed, for reasons I blogged on 16 January 2010. I remember the SANS DFIR 2008 event as effectively "APTCon," but beyond Mandiant, Northrup Grumman, and NetWitness, no one was really talking publicly about the APT until after Google.As I noted in the July 2009 blog post, You Down With APT? (ugh):Aside from Northrup Grumman, Mandiant, and a few vendors (like NetWitness, one of the full capture vendors out there) mentioning APT, there's not much else available. A Google search for "advanced persistent threat" -netwitness -mandiant -Northrop yields 34 results (prior to this blog post). (emphasis added)Today that search yields 244,000 results.I would argue we're "past APT." APT was the buzzword for RSA and other vendor-centric events from, say, 2011-2015, with 2013 being the peak following Mandiant's APT1 report.The threat hasn't disappeared, but it has changed. I wrote my Tweet to mark a milestone and to note that I played a small part in it.All my APT posts here are reachable by this APT tag. Also see my 2010 article for Information Security Magazine titled What APT Is, and What It Isn't.Copyright 2003-2016 Richard Bejtlich and TaoSecurity ( and[...]

Happy 15th Birthday TaoSecurity Blog

Mon, 08 Jan 2018 19:49:00 +0000

Today, 8 January 2018, is the 15th birthday of TaoSecurity Blog! This is also my 3,020th blog post.I wrote my first post on 8 January 2003 while working as an incident response consultant for Foundstone.I don't believe I've released statistics for the blog before, so here are a few. Blogger started providing statistics in May 2010, so these apply to roughly the past 8 years only!As of today, since May 2010 the blog has nearly 7.7 million all time page views.Here are the most popular posts as of today:Twitter continues to play a role in the way I communicate. When I last reported on a blog birthday two years ago, I said that I had nearly 36,000 Twitter followers for @taosecurity, with roughly 16,000 Tweets. Today I have nearly 49,000 followers with less than 18,000 Tweets. As with most people on social media, blogging has taken a back seat to more instant forms of communication.These days I am active on Instagram as @taosecurity as well. That account is a departure from my social media practice. On Twitter I have separate accounts for cybersecurity and intelligence (@taosecurity), martial arts (@rejoiningthetao), and other purposes. My Instagram @taosecurity account is a unified account, meaning I talk about whatever I feel like. During the last two years I also started another blog to which I regularly contribute -- Rejoining the Tao. I write about my martial arts journey there, usually once a week.Once in a while I post to LinkedIn, but it's usually news of a blog post like this, or other LinkedIn content of interest.What's ahead? You may remember I was working on a PhD and I had left FireEye. I decided to abandon my PhD in the fall of 2016. I realized I was not an academic, although I had written four books.I have also changed all the goals I named in my post-FireEye announcement.For the last year I have been doing limited security consulting, but that has been increasing in recent months. I continue to be involved in martial arts, but I no longer plan to be a Krav Maga instructor nor to open my own school.For several months I've been working with a co-author and subject matter expert on a new book with martial arts applicability. I've been responsible for editing and publishing. I'll say more about that at Rejoining the Tao when the time is right.Thank you to everyone who has been part of this blog's journey since 2003!Copyright 2003-2016 Richard Bejtlich and TaoSecurity ( and[...]

Spectre and Meltdown from a CNO Perspective

Fri, 05 Jan 2018 15:18:00 +0000

Longtime readers know that I have no problem with foreign countries replacing American vendors with local alternatives. For example, see Five Reasons I Want China Running Its Own Software. This is not a universal principle, but as an American I am fine with it. Putting my computer network operations (CNO) hat on, I want to share a few thoughts about the intersection of the anti-American vendor mindset with the recent Spectre and Meltdown attacks.

There are probably non-Americans, who, for a variety of reasons, feel that it would be "safer" for them to run their cloud computing workloads on non-American infrastructure. Perhaps they feel that it puts their data beyond the reach of the American Department of Justice. (I personally feel that it's an over-reach by DoJ to try to access data beyond American borders, eg Microsoft Corp. v. United States.)

The American intelligence community and computer network operators, however, might prefer to have that data outside American borders. These agencies are still bound by American laws, but those laws generally permit exploitation overseas.

Now put this situation in the context of Spectre and Meltdown. Begin with the attack scenario mentioned by Nicole Perlroth, where an attacker rents a few minutes of time on various cloud systems, then leverages Spectre and/or Meltdown to try to gather sensitive data from other virtual machines on the same physical hardware.

No lawyer or judge would allow this sort of attack scenario if it were performed in American systems. It would be very difficult, I think, to minimize data in this kind of "fishing expedition." Most of the data returned would belong to US persons and would be subject to protection. Sure, there are conspiracy theorists out there who will never trust that the US government follows its own laws. These people are sure that the USG already knew about Spectre and Meltdown and ravaged every American cloud system already, after doing the same with the "Intel Management Engine backdoors."

In reality, US law will prevent computer network operators from running these sorts of missions on US cloud infrastructure. Overseas, it's a different story. Non US-persons do not enjoy the same sorts of privacy protections as US persons. Therefore, the more "domestic" (non-American) the foreign target, the better. For example, if the IC identified a purely Russian cloud provider, it would not be difficult for the USG to authorize a Spectre-Meltdown collection operation against that target.

I have no idea if this is happening, but this was one of my first thoughts when I first heard about this new attack vector.

Bonus: it's popular to criticize academics who research cybersecurity. They don't seem to find much that is interesting or relevant. However, academics played a big role in discovering Spectre and Meltdown. Wow!

On "Advanced" Network Security Monitoring

Mon, 04 Dec 2017 16:29:00 +0000

My TaoSecurity News page says I taught 41 classes lasting a day or more, from 2002 to 2014. All of these involved some aspect of network security monitoring (NSM). Many times students would ask me when I would create the "advanced" version of the class, usually in the course feedback. I could never answer them, so I decided to do so in this blog post.

The short answer is this: at some point, advanced NSM is no longer NSM. If you consider my collection - analysis - escalation - response model, NSM extensions from any of those phases quickly have little or nothing to do with the network.

Here are a few questions I have received concerned "advanced NSM," paired with the answers I could have provided.

Q: "I used NSM to extract a binary from network traffic. What do I do with this binary?"

A: "Learn about reverse engineering and binary analysis."


Q: "I used NSM to extra Javascript from a malicious Web page. What do I do with this Javascript?"

A: "Learn about Javascript de-obfuscation and programming."


Q: "I used NSM to capture an exchange between a Windows client and a server. What does it mean?"

A: "Learn about Server Message Block (SMB) or Common Internet File System (CIFS)."


Q: "I used NSM to capture cryptographic material exchanged between a client and a server. How do I understand it?"

A: "Learn about cryptography."


Q: "I used NSM to grab shell code passed with an exploit against an Internet-exposed service. How do I tell what it does?"

A: "Learn about programming in assembly."


Q: "I want to design custom hardware for packet capture. How do I do that?"

A: "Learn about programming ASICs (application specific integrated circuits)."

I realized that I had the components of all of this "advanced NSM" material in my library. I had books on reverse engineering and binary analysis, Javascript, SMB/CIFS, cryptography, assembly programming, ASICs, etc.

The point is that eventually the NSM road takes you to other aspects of the cyber security landscape.

Are there *any* advanced area for NSM? One could argue that protocol analysis, as one finds in tools like Bro, Suricata, Snort, Wireshark, and so on constitute advanced NSM. However, you could just as easily argue that protocol analysis becomes more about understanding the programming and standards behind each of the protocols.

In brief, to learn advanced NSM, expand beyond NSM.

How to Minimize Leaking

Sat, 21 Oct 2017 19:43:00 +0000

(image) I am hopeful that President Trump will not block release of the remaining classified documents addressing the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I grew up a Roman Catholic in Massachusetts, so President Kennedy always fascinated me.

The 1991 Oliver Stone movie JFK fueled several years of hobbyist research into the assassination. (It's unfortunate the movie was so loaded with fictional content!) On the 30th anniversary of JFK's death in 1993, I led a moment of silence from the balcony of the Air Force Academy chow hall during noon meal. While stationed at Goodfellow AFB in Texas, Mrs B and I visited Dealey Plaza in Dallas and the Sixth Floor Museum.

Many years later, thanks to a 1992 law partially inspired by the Stone movie, the government has a chance to release the last classified assassination records. As a historian and former member of the intelligence community, I hope all of the documents become public. This would be a small but significant step towards minimizing the culture of information leaking in Washington, DC. If prospective leakers were part of a system that was known for releasing classified information prudently, regularly, and efficiently, it would decrease the leakers' motivation to evade the formal declassification process.

Many smart people have recommended improvements to the classification system. Check out this 2012 report for details.

Latest Book Inducted into Cybersecurity Canon

Mon, 08 May 2017 15:08:00 +0000

Thursday evening Mrs B and I were pleased to attend an awards seminar for the Cybersecurity Canon. This is a project sponsored by Palo Alto Networks and led by Rick Howard. The goal is "identify a list of must-read books for all cybersecurity practitioners."Rick reviewed my fourth book The Practice of Network Security Monitoring in 2014 and someone nominated it for consideration in 2016. I was unaware earlier this year that my book was part of a 32-title "March Madness" style competition. My book won the five rounds, resulting in its conclusion in the 2017 inductee list! Thank you to all those that voted for my book.Ben Rothke awarded me the Canon trophy.Ben Rothke interviewed me prior to the induction ceremony. We discussed some current trends in security and some lessons from the book. I hope to see that interviewed published by Palo Alto Networks and/or the Cybersecurity canon project in the near future.In my acceptance speech I explained how I wrote the book because I had not yet dedicated a book to my youngest daughter, since she was born after my third book was published.A teaching moment at Black Hat Abu Dhabi in December 2012 inspired me to write the book. While teaching network security monitoring, one of the students asked "but where do I install the .exe on the server?"I realized this student had no idea of physical access to a wire, or using a system to collect and store network traffic, or any of the other fundamental concepts inherent to NSM. He thought NSM was another magical software package to install on his domain controller.Four foreign language editions.Thanks to the interpretation assistance of a local Arabic speaker, I was able to get through to him. However, the experience convinced me that I needed to write a new book that built NSM from the ground up, hence the selection of topics and the order in which I presented them.While my book has not (yet?) been translated into Arabic, there are two Chinese language editions, a Korean edition, and a Polish edition! I also know of several SOCs who provide a copy of the book to all incoming analysts. The book is also a text in several college courses.I believe the book remains relevant for anyone who wants to learn the NSM methodology to detect and respond to intrusions. While network traffic is the example data source used in the book, the NSM methodology is data source agnostic.In 2002 Bamm Visscher and I defined NSM as "the collection, analysis, and escalation of indications and warnings to detect and respond to intrusions." This definition makes no reference to network traffic.It is the collection-analysis-escalation framework that matters. You could perform NSM using log files, or host-centric data, or whatever else you use for indications and warning.I have no plans for another cybersecurity book. I am currently editing a book about combat mindset written by the head instructor of my Krav Maga style and his colleague.Thanks for asking for an autograph!Palo Alto hosted a book signing and offered free books for attendees. I got a chance to speak with Steven Levy, whose book Hackers was also inducted. I sat next to him during the book signing, as shown in the picture at right.Thank you to Palo Alto Networks, Rick Howard, Ben Rothke, and my family for making inclusion in the Cybersecurity Canon possible. The awards dinner was a top-notch event. Mrs B and I enjoyed meeting a variety of people, including students in local cybersecurity degree programs.I closed my acceptance speech with the following from the end of the Old Testament, at the very end of 2nd Maccabees. It captures my goal when writing books:"So I too will here end my story. If it is well told and to the point, that is what I myself desired; if it is poorly done and mediocre, that was the best I could do."If you'd like a copy of The Practice of Network Security Monitor[...]

Five Reasons I Want China Running Its Own Software

Thu, 23 Mar 2017 14:20:00 +0000

Periodically I read about efforts by China, or Russia, or North Korea, or other countries to replace American software with indigenous or semi-indigenous alternatives. I then reply via Twitter that I love the idea, with a short reason why. This post will list the top five reasons why I want China and other likely targets of American foreign intelligence collection to run their own software.1. Many (most?) non-US software companies write lousy code. The US is by no means perfect, but our developers and processes generally appear to be superior to foreign indigenous efforts. Cisco vs Huawei is a good example. Cisco has plenty of problems, but it has processes in place to manage them, plus secure code development practices. Lousy indigenous code means it is easier for American intelligence agencies to penetrate foreign targets. (An example of a foreign country that excels in writing code is Israel, but thankfully it is not the same sort of priority target like China, Russia, or North Korea.)2. Many (most?) non-US enterprises are 5-10 years behind US security practices. Even if a foreign target runs decent native code, the IT processes maintaining that code are lagging compared to American counterparts. Again, the US has not solved this problem by any stretch of the imagination. However, relatively speaking, American inventory management, patch management, and security operations have the edge over foreign intelligence targets. Because non-US enterprises running indigenous code will not necessarily be able to benefit from American expertise (as they might if they were running American code), these deficiencies will make them easier targets for foreign exploitation.3. Foreign targets running foreign code is win-win for American intel and enterprises. The current vulnerability equities process (VEP) puts American intelligence agencies in a quandary. The IC develops a zero-day exploit for a vulnerability, say for use against Cisco routers. American and Chinese organizations use Cisco routers. Should the IC sit on the vulnerability in order to maintain access to foreign targets, or should it release the vulnerability to Cisco to enable patching and thereby protect American and foreign systems?This dilemma disappears in a world where foreign targets run indigenous software. If the IC identifies a vulnerability in Cisco software, and the majority of its targets run non-Cisco software, then the IC is more likely (or should be pushed to be more likely) to assist with patching the vulnerable software. Meanwhile, the IC continues to exploit Huawei or other products at its leisure.4. Writing and running indigenous code is the fastest way to improve. When foreign countries essentially outsource their IT to vendors, they become program managers. They lose or never develop any ability to write and run quality software. Writing and running your own code will enroll foreign organizations in the security school of hard knocks. American intel will have a field day for 3-5 years against these targets, as they flail around in a perpetual state of compromise. However, if they devote the proper native resources and attention, they will learn from their mistakes. They will write and run better software. Now, this means they will become harder targets for American intel, but American intel will retain the advantage of point 3.5. Trustworthy indigenous code will promote international stability. Countries like China feel especially vulnerable to American exploitation. They have every reason to be scared. They run code written by other organizations. They don't patch it or manage it well. Their security operations stink. The American intel community could initiate a complete moratorium on hacking China, and the Chinese would still be ravaged by other countries or criminal hackers, all the w[...]

Cybersecurity Domains Mind Map

Tue, 21 Mar 2017 13:17:00 +0000

Last month I retweeted an image labelled "The Map of Cybersecurity Domains (v1.0)". I liked the way this graphic divided "security" into various specialties. At the time I did not do any research to identify the originator of the graphic.Last night before my Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu class I heard some of the guys talking about certifications. They were all interested in "cybersecurity" but did not know how to break into the field. The domain image came to mind as I mentioned that I had some experience in the field. I also remembered an article Brian Krebs asked me to write titled "How to Break Into Security, Bejtlich Edition," part of a series on that theme. I wrote:Providing advice on “getting started in digital security” is similar to providing advice on “getting started in medicine.” If you ask a neurosurgeon he or she may propose some sort of experiment with dead frog legs and batteries. If you ask a dermatologist you might get advice on protection from the sun whenever you go outside. Asking a “security person” will likewise result in many different responses, depending on the individual’s background and tastes.I offered to help the guys in my BJJ class find the area of security that interests them and get started in that space. I thought the domains graphic might facilitate that conversation, so I decided to identify the originator so as to give proper credit.It turns out that that CISO at Oppenheimer & Co, Henry Jiang, created the domains graphic. Last month at LinkedIn he published an updated Map of Cybersecurity Domains v2.0:Map of Cybersecurity Domains v2.0 by Henry JiangIf I could suggest a few changes for an updated version, I would try to put related disciplines closer to each other. For example, I would put the Threat Intelligence section right next to Security Operations. I would also swap the locations of Risk Assessment and Governance. Governance is closer to the Framework and Standard arena. I would also move User Education to be near Career Development, since both deal with people.On a more substantive level, I am not comfortable with the Risk Assessment section. Blue Team and Red Team are not derivatives of a Penetration test, for example. I'm not sure how to rebuild that section.These are minor issues overall. The main reason I like this graphic is that it largely captures the various disciplines one encounters in "cybersecurity." I could point a newcomer to the field at this image and ask "does any of this look interesting?" I could ask someone more experienced "in which areas have your worked?" or "in which areas would you like to work?"The cropped image at the top of this blog shows the Security Operations and Threat Intelligence areas, where I have the most experience. Another security person could easily select a completely different section and still be considered a veteran. Our field is no longer defined by a small set of skills!What do you think of this diagram? What changes would you make?Copyright 2003-2016 Richard Bejtlich and TaoSecurity ( and[...]

Bejtlich Moves On

Fri, 17 Mar 2017 12:00:00 +0000

Exactly six years ago today I announced that I was joining Mandiant to become the company's first CSO. Today is my last day at FireEye, the company that bought Mandiant at the very end of 2013.The highlights of my time at Mandiant involved two sets of responsibilities.First, as CSO, I enjoyed working with my small but superb security team, consisting of Doug Burks, Derek Coulsen, Dani Jackson, and Scott Runnels. They showed that "a small team of A+ players can run circles around a giant team of B and C players."Second, as a company spokesperson, I survived the one-of-a-kind ride that was the APT1 report. I have to credit our intel and consulting teams for the content, and our marketing and government teams for keeping me pointed in the right direction during the weeks of craziness that ensued.At FireEye I transitioned to a strategist role because I was spending so much time talking to legislators and administration officials. I enjoyed working with another small but incredibly effective team: government relations. Back by the combined FireEye-Mandiant intel team, we helped policy makers better understand the digital landscape and, more importantly, what steps to take to mitigate various risks.Where do I go from here?Twenty years ago last month I started my first role in the information warfare arena, as an Air Force intelligence officer assigned to Air Intelligence Agency at Security Hill in San Antonio, Texas. Since that time I've played a small part in the "cyber wars," trying to stop bad guys while empowering good guys.I've known for several years that my life was heading in a new direction. It took me a while, but now I understand that I am not the same person who used to post hundreds of blog entries per year, and review 50 security books per year, and write security books and articles, and speak to reporters, and testify before Congress, and train thousands of students worldwide.That mission is accomplished. I have new missions waiting.My near-term goal is to identify opportunities in the security space which fit with my current interests. These include:Promoting open source software to protect organizations of all sizesAdvising venture capitalists on promising security start-upsHelping companies to write more effective security job descriptions and to interview and select the best candidates availableMy intermediate-term goal is to continue my Krav Maga training, which I started in January 2016. My focus is the General Instructor Course process required to become a fully certified instructor. I will also continue training in my other arts, such as Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu. Krav, though, is the priority, thanks to the next goal.My main instructor, Nick Masi (L) and his instructor, Eyal Yanilov (R)My long-term goal is to open a Krav Maga school in the northern Virginia area in the fall of 2018. Accomplishing this goal requires completing the GIC process and securing a studio and students to join me on this new journey. I plan to offer private training, plus specialized seminars for other executives who feel burned out, or who seek self-defense or fitness. I will also offer classes tailored for kids and women, to meet the requirements of those important parts of our human family.Anyone who has spoken with me about these changes has sensed my enthusiasm. I've also likely encouraged them to join me at my current Krav Maga school, First Defense in Herndon, VA. Tell them Richard sent you!Change, while often uncomfortable, is a powerful growth accelerator. I am thankful that my family, and my wife Amy in particular, are so supportive of my initiatives.If you would like to join me in any of these endeavors, please leave a comment here with your email address, or email me via taosecurity at gmail do[...]

The Missing Trends in M-Trends 2017

Wed, 15 Mar 2017 16:37:00 +0000

FireEye released the 2017 edition of the Mandiant M-Trends report yesterday. I've been a fan of this report since the 2010 edition, before I worked at the company.Curiously for a report with the name "trends" in the title, this and all other editions do not publish the sorts of yearly trends I would expect. This post will address that limitation.The report is most famous for its "dwell time" metric, which is the median (not average, or "mean") number of days an intruder spends inside a target company until he is discovered.Each report lists the statistic for the year in consideration, and compares it to the previous year. For example, the 2017 report, covering incidents from 2016, notes the dwell time has dropped from 146 days in 2015, to 99 days in 2016.The second most interesting metric (for me) is the split between internal and external notification. Internal notification means that the target organization found the intrusion on its own. External notification means that someone else informed the target organization. The external party is often a law enforcement or intelligence agency, or a managed security services provider. The 2016 split was 53% internal vs 47% external.How do these numbers look over the years that the M-Trends report has been published? Inquiring minds want to know.The 2012 M-Trends report was the first edition to include these statistics. I have included them for that report and all subsequent editions in the table below. Year Days Internal External 2011 416 6 94 2012 243 37 63 2013 229 33 67 2014 205 31 69 2015 146 47 53 2016 99 53 47 As you can see, all of the numbers are heading in the right direction. We are finally into double digits for dwell time, but over 3 months is still far too long. Internal detection continues to rise as well. This is a proxy for the maturity of a security organization, in my opinion.Hopefully future M-Trends reports will include tables like this.Copyright 2003-2016 Richard Bejtlich and TaoSecurity ( and[...]

The Origin of Threat Hunting

Tue, 14 Mar 2017 14:33:00 +0000

2011 Article "Become a Hunter"The term "threat hunting" has been popular with marketers from security companies for about five years. Yesterday Anton Chuvakin asked about the origin of the term.I appear to have written the first article describing threat hunting in any meaningful way. It was published in the July-August 2011 issue of Information Security Magazine and was called "Become a Hunter." I wrote it in the spring of 2011, when I was director of incident response for GE-CIRT. Relevant excerpts include:"To best counter targeted attacks, one must conduct counter-threat operations (CTOps). In other words, defenders must actively hunt intruders in their enterprise. These intruders can take the form of external threats who maintain persistence or internal threats who abuse their privileges. Rather than hoping defenses will repel invaders, or that breaches will be caught by passive alerting mechanisms, CTOps practitioners recognize that defeating intruders requires actively detecting and responding to them. CTOps experts then feed the lessons learned from finding and removing attackers into the software development lifecycle (SDL) and configuration and IT management processes to reduce the likelihood of future incidents...In addition to performing SOC work, CTOps requires more active, unstructured, and creative thoughts and approaches. One way to characterize this more vigorous approach to detecting and responding to threats is the term “hunting.” In the mid-2000s, the Air Force popularized the term “hunter-killer” for a missions whereby teams of security experts performed “friendly force projection” on their networks. They combed through data from systems and in some cases occupied the systems themselves in order to find advanced threats. The concept of “hunting” (without the slightly more aggressive term “killing”) is now gaining ground in the civilian world.2013 Book "The Practice of NSM"If the SOC is characterized by a group that reviews alerts for signs of intruder action, the CIRT is recognized by the likelihood that senior analysts are taking junior analysts on “hunting trips.” A senior investigator who has discovered a novel or clever way to possibly detect intruders guides one or more junior analysts through data and systems looking for signs of the enemy. Upon validating the technique (and responding to any enemy actions), the hunting team should work to incorporate the new detection method into the repeatable processes used by SOC-type analysts. This idea of developing novel methods, testing them into the wild, and operationalizing them is the key to fighting modern adversaries."The "hunting trips" I mentioned were activities that our GE-CIRT incident handlers -- David Bianco,  Ken Bradley, Tim Crothers, Tyler Hudak, Bamm Visscher, and Aaron Wade -- were conducting. Aaron in particular was a driving force for hunting methodology.I also discussed hunting in chapter 9 of my 2013 book The Practice of Network Security Monitoring, contrasting it with "matching" as seen in figure 9-2. (If you want to save 30% off the book at No Starch, use discount code "NSM101.")The question remains: from where did I get the term "hunt"? My 2011 article stated "In the mid-2000s, the Air Force popularized the term “hunter-killer." My friend Doug Steelman, a veteran of the Air Force, NSA, and Cyber Command, provided a piece of the puzzle on Twitter. He posted a link to a 2009 presentation by former NSA Vulnerability and Analysis Operations (VAO) chief Tony Sager, a friend of this blog.July 2009 Presentation by Tony SagerIn the mid-2000s I was attending an annual conference held by NSA called the Red Team/Blue Team Symposium, or ReBl for short. ReBl took [...]

Does Reliable Real Time Detection Demand Prevention?

Mon, 13 Feb 2017 23:22:00 +0000

Chris Sanders started a poll on Twitter asking "Would you rather get a real-time alert with partial context immediately, or a full context alert delayed by 30 mins?" I answered by saying I would prefer full context delayed by 30 minutes. I also replied with the text at left, from my first book The Tao of Network Security Monitoring (2004). It's titled "Real Time Isn't Always the Best Time."

Dustin Webber then asked "if you have [indicators of compromise] IOC that merit 'real-time' notification then you should be in the business of prevention. Right?"

Long ago I decided to not have extended conversations over Twitter, as well as to not try to compress complex thoughts into 140 characters -- hence this post!

There is a difference, in my mind, between high-fidelity matching (using the vernacular from my newest book, The Practice of Network Security Monitoring, 50% off now with code RSAREADING) and prevention.

To Dustin's point, I agree that if it is possible to generate a match (or "alert," etc.) with 100% accuracy (or possibly near 100%, depending on the severity of the problematic event), i.e., with no chance or almost no chance of a false positive, then it is certainly worth seeking a preventive action for that problematic event. To use a phrase from the last decade, "if you can detect it, why can't you prevent it?"

However, there are likely cases where zero- or low-false positive events do not have corresponding preventive actions. Two come to mind.

First, although you can reliably detect a problem, you may not be able to do anything about it. The security team may lack the authority, or technical capability, to implement a preventive action.

Second, although you can reliably detect a problem, you may not want to do anything about it. The security team may desire to instead watch an intruder until such time that containment or incident mitigation is required.

This, then, is my answer to Dustin's question!

Guest Post: Bamm Visscher on Detection

Sun, 12 Feb 2017 12:59:00 +0000

Yesterday my friend Bamm Visscher published a series of Tweets on detection. I thought readers might like to digest it as a lightly edited blog post. Here, then, is the first ever (as far as I can remember) guest post on TaoSecurity Blog. Enjoy.

When you receive new [threat] intel and apply it in your detection environment, keep in mind all three analysis opportunities: RealTime, Batch, and Hunting.

If your initial intelligence analysis produces high context and quality details, it's a ripe candidate for RealTime detection.

If analysts can quickly and accurately process events generated by the [RealTime] signature, it's a good sign the indicator should be part of RealTime detection. If an analyst struggles to determine if a [RealTime alert] has detected malicious activity, it's likely NOT appropriate for RealTime detection.

If [the threat] intelligence contains limited context and/or details, try leveraging Batch Analysis with scheduled data reports as a better detection technique. Use Batch Analysis to develop better context (both positive and negative hits) to identify better signatures for RealTime detection.

Hunting is the soft science of detection, and best done with a team of diverse skills. Intelligence, content development, and detection should all work together. Don't fear getting skunked on your hunting trips. Keep investing time. The rewards are accumulative. Be sure to pass Hunting rewards into Batch Analysis and RealTime detection operations in the form of improved context.

The biggest mistake organizations make is not placing emphasis outside of RealTime detection, and "shoe-horning" [threat] intelligence into RealTime operations. So called "Atomic Indicators" tend to be the biggest violator of shoe-horning. Atomic indicators are easy to script into signature driven detection devices, but leave an analyst wondering what he is looking at and for.

Do not underestimate the NEGATIVE impact of GOOD [threat] intelligence inappropriately placed into RealTime operations! Mountains of indiscernible events will lead to analyst fatigue and increase the risk of good analyst missing a real incident.

Bejtlich Books Explained

Thu, 09 Feb 2017 15:21:00 +0000

A reader asked me to explain the differences between two of my books. I decided to write a public response.If you visit the TaoSecurity Books page, you will see two different types of books. The first type involves books which list me as author or co-author. The second involves books to which I have contributed a chapter, section, or foreword.This post will only discuss books which list me as author or co-author.In July 2004 I published The Tao of Network Security Monitoring: Beyond Intrusion Detection. This book was the result of everything I had learned since 1997-98 regarding detecting and responding to intruders, primarily using network-centric means. It is the most complete examination of NSM philosophy available. I am particularly happy with the NSM history appendix. It cites and summarizes influential computer security papers over the four decade history of NSM to that point.The main problem with the Tao is that certain details of specific software versions are very outdated. Established software like Tcpdump, Argus, and Sguil function much the same way, and the core NSM data types remain timeless. You would not be able to use the Bro chapter with modern Bro versions, for example. Still, I recommend anyone serious about NSM read the Tao.The introduction describes the Tao using these words:Part I offers an introduction to Network Security Monitoring, an operational framework for the collection, analysis, and escalation of indications and warnings (I&W) to detect and respond to intrusions.   Part I begins with an analysis of the terms and theory held by NSM practitioners.  The first chapter discusses the security process and defines words like security, risk, and threat.  It also makes assumptions about the intruder and his prey that set the stage for NSM operations.  The second chapter addresses NSM directly, explaining why NSM is not implemented by modern NIDS' alone.  The third chapter focuses on deployment considerations, such as how to access traffic using hubs, taps, SPAN ports, or inline devices.  Part II begins an exploration of the NSM “product, process, people” triad.  Chapter 4 is a case study called the “reference intrusion model.”  This is an incident explained from the point of view of an omniscient observer.  During this intrusion, the victim collected full content data in two locations.  We will use those two trace files while explaining the tools discussed in Part II.  Following the reference intrusion model, I devote chapters to each of the four types of data which must be collected to perform network security monitoring – full content, session, statistical, and alert data.  Each chapter describes open source tools tested on the FreeBSD operating system and available on other UNIX derivatives.  Part II also includes a look at tools to manipulate and modify traffic.  Featured in Part II are little-discussed NIDS' like Bro and Prelude, and the first true open source NSM suite, Sguil.Part III continues the NSM triad by discussing processes.  If analysts don’t know how to handle events, they’re likely to ignore them.  I provide best practices in one chapter, and follow with a second chapter explicitly for technical managers.  That material explains how to conduct emergency NSM in an incident response scenario, how to evaluate monitoring vendors, and how to deploy a NSM architecture.Part IV is intended for analysts and their supervisors.  Entry level and intermediate analysts frequently wonder how to move to the next level of their profession.  I offer some guidan[...]

Meeting Cliff Stoll

Tue, 31 Jan 2017 18:02:00 +0000

(image) Today I had the chance to meet the man who unintentionally invented the modern digital forensics practice, Cliff Stoll. In 1989 he published a book about his 1986-87 detection and response against KGB-backed spies who hacked his lab and hundreds of government, military, and university computers. I read his book in high school and it later inspired my military and private computer security services. Cliff was kind enough to take a photo with me today at the SANS Institute Cyber Threat Intelligence Summit in Virginia.

Check Out My TeePublic Designs

Sun, 18 Dec 2016 16:56:00 +0000

Over the years fans of this blog have asked if I would consider selling merchandise with the TaoSecurity logo. When I taught classes for TaoSecurity from 2005-2007 I designed T-shirts for my students and provided them as part of the registration package. This weekend I decided to exercise my creative side by uploading some designs to TeePublic.

TeePublic offers clothing along with mugs, phone cases, notebooks, and other items.

Two are based on the TaoSecurity logo. One includes the entire logo, along with the company motto of "The Way of Digital Security." The second is a close-up of the TaoSecurity S, which is a modified yin-yang symbol.

Two other designs are inspired by network security monitoring. One is a 1989-era map of MilNet, the United States' military network. This image is found in many places on the Internet, and I used it previously in my classes. The second is a close-up of a switch and router from the TaoSecurity labs. I used this equipment to create packet captures for teaching network security monitoring.

I hope you like these designs. I am particularly partial to the TaoSecurity Logo mug, the TaoSecurity S Logo Mug, and TaoSecurity S Logo t-shirt.

Let me know what you think via comments here.

Update 28 Dec 2016:

Check out the MilNet mug!

Five Ways That Good Guys Share More Than Bad Guys

Tue, 18 Oct 2016 15:15:00 +0000

It takes a lot for me to write a cybersecurity blog post these days. I spend most of my writing time working on my PhD. Articles like Nothing Brings Banks Together Like A Good Hack drive me up the wall, however, and a Tweet rant is insufficient. What fired me up, you might ask? Please read the following excerpt:[Troels] Oerting, with no small dose of grudging admiration, says his adversaries excel at something that can’t be addressed with deep pockets or killer software: They’re superb networkers. “The organized crime groups in cyber are sharing much better than we are at the moment,” says Oerting, a Dane with a square jaw and the watchful eyes of a cop who’s investigated the underworld for 35 years. “They are sharing methodologies, knowledge, tools, practices—what works and what doesn’t.”Statements like these are regularly submitted without evidence. In response, I provide five sources of evidence why organized crime groups do not share more than defenders.1. Solution providers share. Both commercial and not-for-profit solution providers share enormous amounts of information on the security landscape. Some of it is free, and some of it is sold as products or consulting. Thousands of security companies and not-for-profit providers compete for your attention, producing white papers, Webinars, and other resources. You might argue that all of them claim to be the answer to your problem. However, this situation is infinitely better than the 1980s and early 1990s. Back then, hardly any solutions, or even security companies and organizations, existed at all.Criminal solution providers share, but they do so by selling their wares. This is true for the open world as well, but the volume of the open world is orders of magnitude greater.2. Government agencies share. My fellow Americans, has your organization you been visited by the FBI? Federal agents notified more than 3,000 U.S. companies [in 2013] that their computer systems had been hacked. The agents didn't just walk in, drop a letter, and leave. If a relationship did not exist previously, it will now be developed.Beyond third party breach notifications, agencies such as NIST, DHS, and others regularly share information with organizations. They may not share as much as we would like, but again, historical perspective reveals great progress.3. Books, articles, and social media share. The amount of readable material on security is astounding. Again, in the late 1980s and early 1990s hardly any books or articles were available. Now, thousands of resources exist, with new material from publishers like No Starch arriving monthly. Where are the books written by the underground?4. Security conferences share. You could spend every week of the year at a security conference. If you happen to miss a talk, it's likely the incomparable Iron Geek recorded it. Does the underground offer similar opportunities?5. Private groups and limited information exchange groups share. A final category of defender sharing takes place in more controlled settings. These involve well-established Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs), developing Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs), and private mailing lists and forums with limited membership. These could possibly be the closest analogue to the much-esteemed underground. Even if you disregard points 1-4 above, the quality of information shared in this final category absolutely equals, if not exceeds, anything you would find in the criminal world.If you disagree with this analysis[...]

Updated PhD Thesis Title

Mon, 27 Jun 2016 15:24:00 +0000

Yesterday I posted Latest PhD Thesis Title and Abstract. One of my colleagues Ben Buchanan subsequently contacted me via Twitter and we exchanged a few messages. He prompted me to think about the title.

Later I ruminated on the title of a recent book by my advisor, Dr. Thomas Rid. He wrote Cyber War Will Not Take Place. One of the best parts of the book is the title. In six words you get his argument as succinctly as possible. (It could be five words if you pushed "cyber" and "war" together, but the thought alone makes me cringe, in the age of cyber-everything.)

I wondered if I could transform my latest attempt at a thesis title into something that captured my argument in a succinct form.

I thought about the obsession of the majority of the information security community on the tool and tactics level of war. Too many technicians think about security as a single-exchange contest between an attacker and a defender, like a duel.

That reminded me of a problem I have with Carl von Clausewitz's definition of war.

We shall not enter into any of the abstruse definitions of war used by publicists. We shall keep to the element of the thing itself, to a duel. War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale.

- On War, Chapter 1

Clausewitz continues by mentioning "the countless number of duels which make up a war," and then makes his famous statement that "War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will." However, I've never liked the tactically-minded idea that war is a "duel."

This concept, plus the goal to deliver a compact argument, inspired me to revise my thesis title and subtitle to the following:

Campaigns, Not Duels: The Operational Art of Cyber Intrusions

In the first three words I deliver my argument, and in the subtitle I provide context by including my key perspective ("operational art"), environment ("cyber," yes, a little part of me is dying, but it's a keyword), and "intrusions."

When I publish the thesis as a book in 2018, I hope to use the same words in the book title.

Latest PhD Thesis Title and Abstract

Sat, 25 Jun 2016 18:37:00 +0000

In January I posted Why a War Studies PhD? I recently decided to revise my title and abstract to include attention to both offensive and defensive aspects of intrusion campaigns.I thought some readers might be interested in reading about my current plans for the thesis, which I plan to finish and defend in early 2018.The following offers the title and abstract for the thesis.Network Intrusion Campaigns: Operational Art in Cyberspace Campaigns, Not Duels: The Operational Art of Cyber Intrusions*Intruders appear to have the upper hand in cyberspace, eroding users' trust in networked organizations and the data that is their lifeblood. Three assumptions prevail in the literature and mainstream discussion of digital intrusions. Distilled, these assumptions are that attacks occur at blinding speed with immediate consequences, that victims are essentially negligent, and that offensive initiative dominates defensive reaction. This thesis examines these assumptions through two research questions. First, what characterizes network intrusions at different levels of war? Second, what role does operational art play in network intrusion campaigns? By analyzing incident reports and public cases, the thesis refutes the assumptions and leverages the results to improve strategy.  The thesis reveals that strategically significant attacks are generally not "speed-of-light" events, offering little chance for recovery.  Digital defenders are hampered by a range of constraints that reduce their effectiveness while simultaneously confronting intruders who lack such restrictions. Offense does not necessarily overpower defense, constraints notwithstanding, so long as the defenders conduct proper counter-intrusion campaigns. The thesis structure offers an introduction to the subject, and an understanding of cybersecurity challenges and trade-offs. It reviews the nature of digital intrusions and the levels of war, analyzing the interactions at the levels of tools/tactics/technical details, operations and campaigns, and strategy and policy. The thesis continues by introducing historical operational art, applying lessons from operational art to network intrusions, and applying lessons from network intrusions to operational art. The thesis concludes by analyzing the limitations of operational art in evolving digital environments.*See the post Updated PhD Thesis Title for details on the new title.Copyright 2003-2016 Richard Bejtlich and TaoSecurity ( and[...]

Lt Gen David Deptula on Desert Storm and Islamic State

Tue, 19 Jan 2016 19:02:00 +0000

This weekend Vago Muradian interviewed Lt Gen (ret) David Deptula, most famous for his involvement as a key planner for the Desert Storm air campaign.I recommend watching the entire video, which is less than 8 minutes long. Three aspects caught my attention. I will share them here.First, Lt Gen Deptula said that Desert Storm introduced five changes to the character of warfare. I noted that he used the term "character," and not "nature." If you are a student of warfare and/or strategy, you are most likely in the camp that says warfare has an unchanging nature, although its character can change. This is the Clausewitz legacy. A minority camp argues that warfare can change both nature and character.Second, turning to the five changes introduced by Desert Storm, Lt Gen Deptula listed the following.1. Desert Storm introduced "expectations of low casualties, for both sides." I agree with the expectation of low casualties for the US, but I don't think low Iraqi casualties were a primary concern. One could argue that stopping the war during the "highway of death" showed the US didn't want to inflict large casualties on the Iraqi forces, but I still think low casualties were primarily a concern for US troops.2. Desert Storm "normalized precision." Even though a minority of the ordnance delivered during the war were precision weapons, their use steadily increased throughout all later conflicts.3. Desert Storm introduced joint and combined organization and execution. This was indeed quite a step forward, although I recall reading that that USMC airpower took measures to remain as separate as possible.4. Desert Storm put the concepts of "effect-based operations" into action. There is no doubt about this one. Lt Gen Deptula talks about a disagreement with Gen Schwartzkopf's staff concerning disabling the Iraqi power grid. Air power achieved the effect of disabling the grid within 3-4 days, but Schwartzkopf's team used traditional attritional models, noting that less than a certain percentage of destruction mean mission failure. Deptula was right; they were wrong.5. Desert Storm was the first major conflict where airpower was the centerpiece and key force. Call me biased, and no disrespect to the land forces in the Gulf, but I agree with this one.The third and final noteworthy element of the interview involved Lt Gen Deptula's opinion of Islamic State. He said "it's not an insurgency. IS is a state." He said IS possesses the five elements of a state, namely:1. Leadership2. Key essential systems3. Infrastructure4. Population5. Fielded military forcesI agree with his assessment. I also believe that Western leaders are unwilling to grant IS the legitimacy of it being a state, so they persist in calling IS names like ISIS, ISIL, Daesh, and so on. I see no problem with that approach, since it incorporates political sensitivities. However, that approach also aggravates the perception that Western leaders are out of touch with reality.TweetCopyright 2003-2016 Richard Bejtlich and TaoSecurity ( and[...]